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Stymied Expectations 
Buenos Aires' Persistent Efforts to Host Olympic Games 
Cesar R. Torres* 
Argentine elites have shown interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos 
Aires at various times during the twentieth century. Expressions of interest 
intensified after the creation of a stable national Olympic bureaucracy in the 
1920s. The last concerted ef ort was the bid for the 2004 Olympics. Argentine 
Olympic officials have perceived the ef orts to bring the Olympic Games to 
Buenos Aires as an important aspect of their role as promoters of the Olym­
pic Movement. Despite this perception, the history and status of these ef orts 
remain unclear. This article explores the failed attempts to host the Olympic 
Games in Argentina's capital. in doing so, it ascertains how many times Buenos 
Aires actually bid and clarifies the logic, conditions, and forces behind these 
efforts. This article shows that these efforts have served as a terrain in and 
through which Argentines have imagined their collective identity . 
••• • 
Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine elites have attempted to prove that 
their country has adopted the tenets of modern civilization. Their attempts in­
cluded projecting an image of Buenos Aires as a South American enclave in 
which Western ideals flourished. It is no coincidence then that despite Argenti­
na's troubled history of serious political, economic and social crises, those elites 
coveted hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires. The last concerted effort 
was the bid for the 2004 Olympics, ultimately awarded to and successfully staged 
by Athens. Buenos Aires was the only South American city among the five final­
ists, a fact that many porteiios1 took as a testament to the distinctiveness of their 
city. During the weeks before the election of the host for the 2004 Olympics in 
September 1997, the prospect of a Buenos Aires Olympics was a recurrent topic 
of discussion in Argentine society. The history of Buenos Aires' attempts to host 
the Olympic Games, however, was hardly mentioned. 
Given that officials on the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee frequently an­
nounced that Argentina had a long and distinguished record of involvement in 
the Olympic Movement, including severa l efforts to bring the Olympic Games 
to Buenos Aires, the absence of reference to these efforts was all the more in­
triguing. A close inspection of the Buenos Aires 2004 bid materials reveals that 
the emphasis on Argentina's Olympic past included broad and vague statements 
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regarding Buenos Aires' efforts to host the Olympic Games. For example, al­
though one bid document stated, "Buenos Aires applies for the fifth time;'2 
no details of these applications were provided. The press replicated this kind 
of statement. For instance, the daily La Naci6n wrote in June 1997, "The 
enthusiasm to be the host of the Games and the tradition of loyalty to the 
Olympic Movement has become evident in the four previous bids:'3 On the 
other hand, a mid-1970s International Olympic Committee's (IOC) publica­
tion stated that Buenos Aires had already bid for the Olympic Games five 
times.4 Confusingly, a Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee official claimed, after 
the bid failed, that the city had sought to organize the Olympic Games only 
four times.5 
The absence of specifics regarding the city's efforts to host the Olympic 
Games in the Buenos Aires 2004 bid materials might have arisen from the con­
fusion surrounding them and not from a dismissal of Olympic history. After all, 
officials on the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee did not fail to mention that 
Argentine Jose B. Zubiaur was among those chosen by Pierre de Coubertin to 
form the original IOC in 1894.6 These officials knew that although the historical 
arguments offered little help in securing their bid, the politics of nostalgia and 
Olympic romanticism warranted the trumpeting of Argentina's role in regional 
and global Olympic affairs since Zubiaur's days. The lacunae surrounding Bue­
nos Aires' attempts to host the Olympic Games beg historical attention; at the 
very least to set the record straight. More important than merely setting the 
record straight, the study of these attempts illuminates the evolving character 
of the relationship between politics, sport, and Olympic matters in Argentina 
throughout the twentieth century. 
The examination of Buenos Aires' multiple failed attempts to host the Olym­
pic Games underscores complex political processes at play. In doing so, it not 
only ascertains how many times Buenos Aires actually bid to host the Olympic 
Games but also clarifies the logic, conditions, and forces that prompted sport 
and governmental officials as well as civic leaders to consider the city as a poten­
tially successful host and to articulate efforts for a Buenos Aires Olympics. To 
comprehend the drive behind the efforts for a Buenos Aires Olympics requires 
the evaluation of the way in which Olympic proponents constructed legitimat­
ing narratives at both the domestic and international levels to project particular 
representations of Buenos Aires and Argentina. The study of Buenos Aires' bids 
also helps explain why these efforts eventually failed and assists in discussing 
whether the city could be an Olympic host in the near future. 
Early Expressions of Interest 
Interest in the Olympic Movement arose in Argentina just a decade after Cou­
bertin in 1894 named Zubiaur a founding member of the IOC. However, it was 
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not Zubiaur, who considered sport an educational tool, but the aristocratic 
porteiios, a group that saw sport participation as a distinctive attribute of gentle­
men, who promoted Coubertin's Games and ideology in their country? The idea 
to bring the Olympic Games to the nation's capital first found expression dur­
ing the early stages of Olympic diffusion in Argentina. A year after a proposal 
advanced by elite Argentine sporting circles that the government subsidize an 
official Olympic delegation to the 1908 London Olympics, the initiative was re­
jected by Congress.8 Manifesting his admiration for physical exercises, Senator 
Joaquin V. Gonzalez declared to a session of the Senate: 
... their necessity is evident, given the increasing development of 
these healthy exercises, so prestigious in the contemporary world, 
for they have originated the beautiful institution of the universal 
olympic games, that someday must take place in the city of Buenos 
Aires, thus fulfilling a national wish that, evidently, is inclined to 
games of this kind that will influence so much the future of the Na­
tion and the race.9 
Gonzalez's vision of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires came while informing the 
Senate about a proposed bill that established the festivities projected to com­
memorate the May 1910 centenary of Argentina's revolution for national inde­
pendence. He lauded the civic virtues of physical exercises, their embrace by 
the Argentine people, and the hope that Buenos Aires one day would serve as 
host to the Olympic Games to justify the construction of"a model house for the 
practice of physical exercises" that would be given to the Club de Gimnasia y Es­
grima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club ).10 Although 
the bill passed, the gymnasium-like building was not built. However, the cen­
tennial festivities included an extensive program of international competitions 
modeled after the Olympic Games commonly regarded as the Juegos Olfmpicos 
del Centenario (Centennial Olympic Games).u Coubertin, ever the sentinel of 
everything Olympic, argued that Manuel Quintana, who had replaced Zubiaur 
in the IOC in 1907, "had used the term 'Olympic Games' improperly for per­
sonal publicity"12 and expelled him from the committee shortly after the closing 
ceremony of the Juegos Olfmpicos del Centenario. Even if this sport festival was a 
sign of Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement it did not warrant, at 
least in Coubertin's mind, the label Olympic. That word was exclusively reserved 
for his "true'' Olympic Games. 
After the expulsion of Quintana in 1910, even though he was not replaced 
until 1922 by a future Argentine president, Marcelo T. de Alvear, Argentine sport 
officials tried- unsuccessfully-to send teams to the 1912 and 1920 Olympic 
Games. Early in the 1920s this failure divided the Argentine sport community, 
inciting complex and problematic attempts to establish an Argentine National 
Olympic Committee (NOC) and to secure control and access to sport. The cre­
ation of a definitive NOC in late 1923, orchestrated by Marcelo de Alvear and 
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Ricardo C. Aldao, a distinguished sport official associated with Alvear's ruling 
party, did not quell all the confrontations raging in Argentine sport but did help 
dispatch the first official Argentine delegation to an Olympic Games, the 1924 
Paris Olympics. 13 This precarious stability prompted local Olympic officials to 
renew their hopes to organize the "true" Olympic Games. 'These hopes were 
once again linked to the construction of sport facilities on the premises of the 
Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires. 
Ricardo C. Aldao (third from the right), president of both 
the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (1907-
46) and the Comite 0/fmpico Argentino (1923-27), IOC 
member (1923-1949), and longtime Olympic promoter, 
with Argentine President Jose Figueroa Alcorta (fourth 
from the right) and other dignitaries at  a reception in 
honor of the foreign delegations attending the Juegos 
Olfmpicos del Centenario on June 25, 1910. 
Ricardo Aldao, who was 
the president of both the Club 
de Gimnasia y Esgrima de 
Buenos Aires and the recently 
created Comite Olimpico Ar­
gentino (Argentine Olympic 
Committee), and had be­
come the nation's second roc 
member in 1923, fervently ex­
pressed to his IOC colleagues 
the Argentine desire to orga­
nize the Olympic Games. He 
did so the very first time he 
took part in an roc session. 
While leading the Argentine 
team to the 1924 Paris Olym­
pics, Aldao reported about the 
state of sport in his nation and 
gave details of the sport facilities to be erected in his club, which he consid­
ered the "oldest and most important [institution] of our countri'14 He reported 
that the Argentine Congress, the government, and the municipality of Buenos 
Aires had agreed to finance a Champ des sports that would include a stadium 
for 100,000 spectators.15 After elucidating the specifics of the financial arrange­
ments, presenting the plans, and even distributing pictures of the works already 
in progress to the IOC assembly, Aldao grandiloquently proclaimed: 
By having this considerable and inexhaustible financial resource at 
its disposal, totally used to build the Stadium and its annexes, Ar­
gentina will very soon be in a position to accept without hesitation, 
the honor that the games of one of the next Olympiads be celebrated 
in Buenos Aires. 16 
The Argentine press replicated Aldao's announcement. According to La Naci6n, 
Aldao went even further, declaring that the stadium "will soon allow Argentina 
to be the theater of future Olympic Games:'17 Interviewed by the same daily, 
Coubertin, who in all probability had been apprised of the stadium by future 
roc President Henri de Baillet-Latour the year before,18 declared that he was 
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amazed by the goodness and grandiosity of the project. It will be 
the most complete sp ort facility in the world, an ideal endeavor, my 
dream for many years. Dr. Aldao has invited me to attend its inaugu­
ration, in the year 1928; if nothing prevents it, it will be a real pleasure 
to go to Buenos Aires, to be present in that transcendental act and 
closely appreciate the magnificent progress of the Argentine people in 
the area of sports. 19 
As much as Coubertin praised the Champ des sports and its stadium, the former 
IOC president did not make even the feeblest remark to kindle Aldao's hope that 
Buenos Aires would soon organize the Olympic Games. In spite of this indica­
tive silence and the fact that the promised massive stadium was nowhere in sight 
on the Buenos Aires landscape, four years after Coubertin's remarks Argentine 
Olympic officials renewed their proposal to bring the Olympic Games to Argen­
tina's capital. Rather than a general announcement, this time their project had a 
specific date, the 1936 Olympics. Apparently, the Argentines did not need much 
international encouragement for their Olympic dreams. 
The Bid Consideration for the 1 9 3 6 Olympic Games 
According to IOC records, Buenos Aires had already made clear its intention 
to bid for the 1936 Olympics as early as 1925, but the city had neither plans nor 
economic guarantees.20 Two years later, the city was no longer among the list 
of candidates, presumably because it was not supported by its government.21 
This warning signal was noted in Argentina. As the Amsterdam Olympics were 
about to get underway in late June of 1928, Aldao wrote a letter to Baillet­
Latour, on his own and President Alvear's behalf, indicating their wish to nomi­
nate Buenos Aires to host the 1936 Olympics. The stadium was a recurrent 
issue, mentioned yet again as one of the main attractions of the proposal. In his 
letter Aldao insisted: 
For this period, our Capital will be in a position to count, with the 
Camp de feux currently being built, an important part of which is 
already functional. We will then have at our disposition a stadium 
that can host 100,000 spectators. 22 
By then, however, Aldao and Alvear had learned, perhaps from having wit­
nessed for a few years how the IOC conducted its affairs regarding future 
Olympic hosts, that a high-profile stadium was not the only element needed to 
impress the committee's members. This time the Argentine Olympic hopefuls 
assured Baillet-Latour that if the IOC accepted their proposal the Argentine 
government would take the necessary measures "to expedite the requirements 
of the Delegates and Sportsmen with respect to their travel and their stay in 
Argentina:'23 Baillet-Latour was delighted with such a generous offer coming 
directly from Argentina's president. The IOC president acknowledged receipt 
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of the bid while Aldao was informed that no decision would be  made before 
1931.24 However, early in 1929, Aldao insisted that the I OC consider his earlier 
proposal if that year's IOC session would take up the question of who would 
host the 1936 Olympics, noting that "all necessary elements for the celebration 
of the XIth. Olympiad will be  available by then" in Buenos Aires.25 Anxious for 
a sign, Aldao indicated to Baillet-Latour once again in April of 1929 that Bue­
nos Aires wanted to host the 1936 Games and remarked that the grand stadium 
would be ready in 1932. He also mentioned that whatever the transportation 
difficulties from Europe to Argentina were, they would be taken care of by 
the Comite Olfmpico Argentino, supported by the Argentine government.26 Al­
though Alvear's presidential term expired in 1928, Hip6lito Yrigoyen, a mem­
ber of Alvear's party, won the election, which presumably provided political 
continuity for the proj ect.27 
When the IOC met in Berlin for its annual session in May of 1930, Buenos 
Aires was among the candidates to host the 1936 Olympics.28 Aldao attended 
the session. Despite seeing Buenos Aires as a candidate for the Games, h e  was 
disturbed by what h e  experienced in Germany. He was displeased with the 
policy adopted by the IOC regarding amateurism that opposed the principle 
of "broken time:' However, he was even more enraged with the method that 
the IOC leadership had used to approve it. Aldao claimed that IOC members 
were forced to vote the way the Executive Committee wanted and that he was 
not given the floor to state his ideas.29 Predictably, Baillet-Latour disagreed 
with Aldao's views. After the 1930 IOC session, both Aldao and Alvear re­
signed from the committee.30 Their action severed the link between the Ar­
gentines and the IOC leadership and badly compromised Buenos Aires' bid 
to host the 1936 Olympics. When the time to choose such a host came at the 
April 1931 IOC session held in Barcelona, Buenos Aires was not on the list of 
candidates.31 In the postal vote of Mexican IOC member Miguel de Beistegui, 
Buenos Aires did appear as a possible candidate.32 Even more paradoxically, 
Baillet-Latour asked Aldao and Alvear to cable their votes.33 This might have 
been a friendly gesture indicating that they were welcomed back in the Olym­
pic fold. Ultimately, B erlin was awarded the 1936 Olympics, and only Alvear 
refused to rejoin the IOC.31 Alvear's decision had more to do with political 
developments in Argentina that eventually forced him into exile, than with 
Aldao's complaints.35 
If the dispute Aldao and Alvear had opened with the IOC leadership had 
already negatively influenced any chance that Buenos Aires had in the race for 
the 1936 Olympics, a major political crisis obliterated the city's hopes. In Sep­
tember 1930, Jose F. Uriburu overthrew the democratically-elected government 
of President Yrigoyen, becoming Argentina's first de facto president. Argentina's 
political institutions were forever affected and life in the nation changed dra­
matically after the coup.36 In spite of the political changes, it was during the 
48 
Stymied Expectations 
first few months ofUriburu's reign that the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Bue­
nos Aires officially opened new facilities at its Champ des sports-but not the 
grand stadium. During the inauguration, attended by Uriburu, Aldao thanked 
a former democratically-elected president, but not Alvear. He also insisted that 
a 100,000-seat stadium was planned, announcing that it would promptly go to 
a public bidding process and adding that the money available allowed it to be 
built in twenty months. 37 
Shortly after these announcements, influential French IOC member Mel­
chior de Polignac visited Buenos Aires and praised the work of the Argentine 
Olympic advocates. Polignac remembered visiting "the magnificent grounds 
of the 'Club de gimnasia y esgrima' which are probably the best in the world;' 
adding that "This is the perfect model and Mr. Aldao, who has brought this ad­
mirable work to fruition, merits the thanks of all sportsmen:'38 Polignac's acco­
lades, like Coubertin's before, failed to mention any prospect of future Olympic 
Games in Buenos Aires. At the time of Polignac's visit, the colossal stadium, the 
centerpiece of the project, was still a dream. Unfortunately, it remained so. 
The Bid Consideration for the 1 940 Olympic Games 
By the time of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, the discord between the Argen­
tine roc members and the roc had dissolved. Aldao was once again active 
in Olympic matters, Alvear had been replaced by Horacio Bustos Moron, then 
president of the Comite Olfmpico Argentino, and Argentina sent a robust team 
to Los Angeles. While athletes competed for Olympic glory under the Califor­
nian sun, the IOC held its annual session. During roc deliberations, Baillet­
Latour announced the cities wishing to organize the 1940 Olympics. Buenos 
Aires made the list. Oddly, all were unofficial candidates.39 Three years later, in 
the roc session held in Oslo, the South American metropolis remained a can­
didate.40 However, it seems that the candidacy received no impetus in Argentina. 
In a letter written to Baillet-Latour two weeks after the Oslo session, Bustos 
Moron, who did not attend the session, said that he and Aldao had voted in fa­
vor of Tokyo for the 1940 Olympics.41 A year later, Bustos Moron reminded the 
IOC president that he favored Tokyo. In these interactions, Buenos Aires was 
not even mentioned. Given his silence regarding the city, his position in Argen­
tine sport, and the fact that he occupied several governmental posts, it seems 
highly unlikely that Bustos Moron was unaware of any Buenos Aires bid.42 TI1e 
1940 Games were eventually awarded to Tokyo. 
In July of 1938, the Japanese, involved in a quest for military conquest, relin 
quished their bid for Tokyo as the site of the 1940 Olympics. The Games were 
first transferred to Helsinki, which had also bid for the Games, then ultimately 
cancelled because of World War II. Fearing the cancellation, the Comite Olim­
pico Argentino saw an opportunity to take the lead in Olympic matters. Shortly 
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after Adolf Hitler's Germany invaded Poland, new Comite president, Juan Car­
los Palacios, wrote to F. W Rubien, secretary of the American Olympic Associa­
tion, proposing: 
In view of the probable suspension of the XII Olympic Games in Fin­
land, due to European situation, this Argentinian Olympic Commit­
tee believes that the efforts of the nations of America . . .  could be ap­
plied in the meantime through a tournament to be ef ected based on 
the sports included in the mentioned games. 43 
Originally, Palacios referred to the tournament as the "Pan-American Olym­
pic Tournament" and then simply as the "Pan-American Games:'44 rThe event 
would take place only if plans for the 1940 Olympics were abandoned. The 
Argentines proposed to host a congress in Buenos Aires in February 1940 to 
organize hemispheric sport matters 1940 and, subsequently, the hemispheric 
competitions in November. To accommodate the greatest number of national 
delegates, the congress was first postponed to April, then to August.45 The 
First Pan-American Congress established the Pan-American Sports Commit­
tee and decided to host Pan-American Games every four years, starting in 
Buenos Aires in 1942.46 
The Argentines immediately started to work with great industry to orga­
nize the Games. They established the Games' organizing committee and set 
the festival from November 21 to December 6. Argentine President Roberto 
Ortiz and Buenos Aires Mayor Carlos Pueyrredon were respectively named 
honorary president and vice-president of the organizing committee.47 The im­
pressive plans included an "Olympic city" and "a stadium with a capacity for 
75,000 spectators:'48 The organizing committee expected to welcome "not less 
than 2,000 athletes:'49 Everything appeared to progress well until the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which prompted the United 
States to enter the war. With the expansion of the conflict into the Western 
Hemisphere, many nations declined to participate in the 1942 Pan-American 
Games. The Argentines postponed the Games several times in the hope of sav­
ing the project, but to no avail; the war, and the harsh political, economic, and 
social conditions it imposed proved an insurmountable challenge for Olympic 
enthusiasts.50 In spite of the setback, the Argentine post-war political envi­
ronment would soon help renovate hopes of staging the first Pan-American 
Games in Buenos Aires. Argentines even dreamed ofbringing the 1956 Olym­
pics to their city. 
The Bid for the 1 956 Olympic Games 
The rise of Juan D. Peron to the presidency of Argentina in 1946 marked a dra­
matic shift in national politics. Attempting to break with the past, Peron prom­
ised the masses "a New Argentina based on social justice, political sovereignty, 
50 
Stymied Expectations 
and economic independence:'51 His concept of social justice included an inno­
vative array of benefits and services for the working class. Broad access to sport 
and physical education was a centerpiece among those innovations. Likewise, 
Peron did not spare resources to advance elite sport. The emphasis placed on 
popular and elite sport by Peron and the political return he expected from it, 
was without precedent in Argentinian history. In this regard, political scientist 
Raanan Rein has observed, "no Argentine government prior to Peron . . .  invest­
ed as much eftort and as many resources in both the development and encour­
agement of sport and in the effort to earn political dividends from this policy."52 
In the context of Peron's "New Argentina;' the hope to host the Olympic Games 
in Buenos Aires was not only rekindled but received a degree of state commit­
ment never seen before in Argentina. 
On January 20, 1948, a year and a half into Peron's first term in office, the 
Comite Olimpico Argentino sent a cable and a letter to the IOC announcing 
that Buenos Aires wanted to organize the 1956 Olympics.53 A week later, IOC 
member Bustos Moron cabled the roc backing up the city's candidacy. Aldao 
was also a keen supporter. 54 Before the end of the month, Ricardo Sanchez de 
Bustamante, then presiding over the Comite, wrote to Sigfrid Edstr0m, Baillet­
Latour's successor as IOC president, a ten-page letter detailing the rationale for 
Buenos Aires' bid. For the Argentine Olympic official, Buenos Aires was suited 
to host the 1956 Olympics because of the Comites dedication to the Olympic 
Movement since its creation in 1923, the national sport organization and the 
extended practice of sport in Argentina, and the governmental support to sport. 
On the other hand, the government had pledged all necessary moral and mate­
rial support for the success of the event, including a national stadium, an Olym­
pic village, and other required facilities. Finally, there was a question of principle: 
since no South American city had hosted the Games, Argentina deserved that 
privilege. For the Comite, if the roc voted for Buenos Aires, it would "satisfy 
the legitimate aspirations of the government of His Excellency the President 
General Juan D. Per6n and that of the sportsmen of the continenf'55 At least in 
Argentine rhetoric, bringing the Games to Buenos Aires fulfilled both a national 
and a South American desire. 
According to Argentine Olympic officials, General Santos V. Rossi, presi­
dent of the Consejo Nacional de Educaci6n Ffsica (National Council of Physi­
cal Education), created under the auspices of Peron, instructed the Comite 
Olfmpico Argentino to communicate to the IOC that Buenos Aires wanted to 
host the 1956 Olympics. 56 Undoubtedly, the matter was of utmost importance 
to the government's highest echelon. Indeed, the Comite later admitted that 
the bid simply reinforced the explicit desire of Peron. 57 In June of 1948, Aldao 
and Bustos Moron sent a letter to their IOC peers to their peers that they had 
previously sent to Edstr0m detailing Buenos Aires' bid. The Argentines af­
firmed, "we have every reason to expect that the Argentine Government would 
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grant the necessary support to permit the Organizing Committee of the XVI 
OLYMPIAD to successfully carry out its work:'58 They concluded by asking 
for IOC consent, stating, "we sincerely hope our Colleagues and Friends will 
support this initiative and vote in its favour when the time arrives to do so:'59 
Informing the full IOC membership about Peron's patronage of the project 
was a wise diplomatic move -the timing was not coincidental. When Buenos 
Aires appeared as a registered candidate for the 1956 Olympics at the next 
IOC session held during the 1948 London Olympics, no one should have been 
surprised. TI1at Buenos Aires received the right to host the first Pan-American 
Games during the Second Pan-American Congress also held while athletes 
competed in London was not surprising either.60 The bidding campaign was 
in full swing. 
While Buenos Aires established itself as a serious international candidate for 
the 1956 Olympics, Peron continued to build support for his sport policy at 
home, a strategy intimately connected to his political project. When the Argen­
tine delegation to the 1948 Olympics returned home, a rally was held at the Club 
Atletico Rive r Plate's stadium. In his address, Peron linked the athletic work and 
triumphs of the nation's athletes to the recreation of Argentina by proclaiming: 
Let this be our tribute to the glories of sports, to the champions, to all 
the athletes who are constructing the New Argentina we yearned for, 
an Argentina of healthy men, sturdy men, and strong men; because 
only healthy, tough peoples make great nations.61 
Against a background of unparalleled governmental sustenance of sport, the 
success of their athletes in the 1948 Olympics, and the plans for the first Pan­
American Games scheduled for 1951 underway, the Argentines moved ahead 
quickly with Buenos Aires' bid to host the 1956 Olympics. Despite the na­
tional sport effervescence, Aldao, vigilant of Olympic principles, cautioned 
Edstr0m in late 1948 that some of his government's deeds in sport were on 
the verge of transgressing those principles. Certainly, Peron and his allies es­
tablished "a centralized supervisory system overseeing all sports:' including 
the appointment of political cronies in sport federations and organizations. 
62 However, Aldao's cautionary communication did not mention any irregu­
larities with Buenos Aires' bid.63 In March of 1949, Rodolfo G. Valenzuela, a 
close associate of Peron's who was the new president of the Comite Olimpico 
Argentino, and Rossi wrote to the IOC repeating their wish to organize the 
1956 Olympics. The long letter replicated the merits of the candidacy, insist­
ing that Buenos Aires "has all the characteristics of the great capitals of the 
world" and that it "is considered one of the better built capitals of America."64 
The Argentines also produced for the IOC a lavish book about Argentina 
that worked as a sort of"formal invitation to celebrate the Olympic Games of 
1956 in this city [Buenos Aires]:'65 In the book, Peron and the city's mayor ex­
pressed their support for the bid. Buenos Aires officially sent the IOC a good 
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General Santos II. Rossi (first from the right), president of the Consejo Nacional de Educaci6n Ffsica 
and an important figure in the bid for the 1956 Olympic Games, attends the lightning of the votive 
lamp ceremony for the Week of the Youth with other officials on September 27, 1948 in Tucumdn. 
deal of additional information about Argentine sports.66 The IOC acknowl­
edged receipt of all material and confirmed the dates of the decisive next IOC 
session that would take place in Rome.67 
On April 28, 1949, officials representing the cities bidding for the 1956 
Olympics appeared before the IOC. They made final attempts to convince IOC 
members that their city was the best suited to host the Games. Argentina was 
represented by Rafael Ocampo Gimenez, Argentine ambassador to Italy, Mario 
L. Negri, future IOC member, Aldao, and Bustos Moron. The latter lobbied his 
colleagues to gain their support. Buenos Aires' campaign achieved some suc­
cess in Latin America. For instance, days before the election, the Uruguayan 
Olympic Committee cabled the roc that it supported Buenos Aires.6S But the 
support was not unanimous; the Brazilian rOC members cabled their votes for 
Detroit.69 In spite of the delegation's effort, Buenos Aires' bid fell one vote short. 
Melbourne beat Buenos Aires in the fourth round by a vote of21-20, garnering 
the right to organize the 1956 Olympics. The Comite Olimpico Argentino turned 
the close defeat into a victory?0 The one vote difference "comforts the spirit and 
satisfies the highest Argentine desires, for all what it means for our Nation and 
Argentine sports:'71 Besides the alleged comfort, the defeat did not discourage a 
new bid. After all, if Peron demanded so much perseverance from his athletes to 
build the "New Argentina;' he could not desist bidding for the Games at the first 
hindrance he faced. Immediately after Melbourne was awarded the 1956 Olym­
pics, the Comite and the Consejo Nacional de Educaci6n Fisica agreed to bid for 
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the 1960 Olympics.72 Bustos Moron promptly expressed his hope that Buenos 
Aires would host the Games in the near future.73 
To show the renewed Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement, 
Rossi offered to organize the 1950 IOC session in Buenos Aires. Since that ses­
sion was already scheduled for Copenhagen, Buenos Aires was considered for 
the following meeting. In Copenhagen, Buenos Aires appeared on lists as both 
a candidate for the 1960 Olympics and for the May 1951 IOC session.74 Buenos 
Aires was turned down for the latter; the IOC chose Vienna. A May 1951 IOC 
session in Buenos Aires would have been great timing and publicity to boost the 
1960 Olympic project. The first Pan-American Games held in Buenos Aires from 
February 25 to March 8 was not only well-organized but also designated as a tre­
mendous success of the Peronist regime. Argentine athletes dominated the medal 
count. An exultant Peron declared that the accomplishment was "a new victory 
that the peronist movement deposits in the altar of the Nation:'75 Shortly after the 
Games, a confident Bustos Moron told Edstr0m that if the 1956 Olympics could 
not be held in Melbourne, Buenos Aires would be willing to take over.76 The 
regime's sport successes and Peron's dream of Olympic glory in Buenos Aires, as 
well as his political edifice, did not last long. In September 1955, the Revoluci6n 
Libertadora (Liberating Revolution) ousted Peron from the presidency. His en­
emies "sought to eradicate every vestige of Peronism from national life, and one 
of its first moves was to 'de-Peronize' sports:'77 Little wonder that bringing the 
Olympics to Buenos Aires was not one of the revolution's priorities. 
The Bid for the t 96 8 Olympic Games 
The Revoluci6n Libertadora's crusade against all things Peronist had an im­
mediate impact on the Argentine Olympic Movement. Not only was a Buenos 
Aires Olympics not prominent on the new authorities' agenda, but also their 
actions severely jeopardized the prospect of sending a national delegation to 
the 1956 Olympics. The provisional government named General Fernando I. 
Huergo as supervisor of the Comite Olfmpico Argentino in order to oversee 
and reorganize it. This situation disturbed Avery Brundage, a rabid apostle of 
amateurism and the Olympic doctrine of strict separation between sport and 
politics- something Peron certainly did not practice-who had become IOC 
president in 1952. In April l956, Brundage warned Argentine officials, "As the 
matter stands it seems that no team from the Argentine can be entered in the 
Melbourne Games:'78 What the IOC wanted was "sport to be ruled by sports­
men and not politicians;' as specified in the Olympic rules.79 Internationally 
pressured, the government decreed in August the conclusion of Huergo's su­
pervision of the Comite with elections for new officials taking place the follow­
ing month. Predictably, when Huergo was elected president of the reorganized 
Comite, Peronist sport advocates were nowhere in sight. Given the election 
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of the Comites new administration, the IOC considered the matter resolved, 
which allowed Argentine athletes to compete in Melbourne.80 However, Ar­
gentine Olympic participation did not entice the Revoluci6n Libertadora to 
revive the project to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires . 
... -
Ricardo C. Aldao (center) visits General Fernando I. Huergo (second from the left), intervenor 
(1955·1956) and president of the Co mite 0/fmpico Argentino (1956·1957), on November 4, 1955. 
The prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires was heard once more only when the 
Revoluci6n Libertadora withdrew from power. In 1958 the revolution allowed 
elections but the ban on Peronism was not lifted. Arturo Frondizi's ticket, se­
cretly endorsed by Peron from his exile, emerged as the winner. Midway into 
Frondizi's term, Jose Oriani, then presiding over the Comite Olfmpico Argentino, 
expressed to the IOC its "hopes as regards the site of the Olympic Games of 
1968:'81 These hopes endured and survived a convoluted period of Argentine 
politics in a way that no politician of the time could. In 1962 Frondizi, defying 
the Army, lifted the ban on Peronism. Frondizi-backed candidates swept the 
March gubernatorial elections. When Frondizi refused to annul the elections, 
the Army deposed him. Jose Maria Guido, president of the Senate, replaced 
Frondizi. Guido's was a puppet regime controlled by the military, which pre­
ferred the pretense of legality to openly seize power. 82 
Soon afterwards, a plan to continue with the Buenos Aires 1968 bid was 
announced. In June of 1962, barely two months after Guido took the oath of 
office, Hernan Giralt, mayor of Buenos Aires, sent the IOC an "official applica­
tion . . .  requesting that our City be awarded the honour of staging the Olympic 
Games to be held in 1968:'83 Days later, Oriani, made it explicit that the "applica­
tion is endorsed and supported by the Argentine Olympic Committee . . .  as well 
as by those of millions of sportsmen of our countrY:' Oriani framed the bid in 
historical tem1s. He argued: 
. . .  that in several opportunities we made every possible effort in or­
der to be entrusted the holding of the greatest of all sport events. You 
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remember that in the course of the 43rd. Session of the I. 0. C., held 
in Rome in 1949, Buenos Aires lost by one vote the right to be chosen, 
and from that moment on we have not abandoned our intention of 
staging the Games, not only because we consider it a legitimate pur­
pose but also because we are sure that we shall be able to organize 
them maintaining and even endeavouring to surpass the brightness 
and splendor they have always had. 84 
The argument that the Olympic Games had never been held in South Amer­
ica was also mentioned.85 To strengthen Buenos Aires' bid, in August 1962 the 
Comite Olimpico Argentino produced a publication recounting Argentine Olym­
pic history and describing the amenities that Buenos Aires had to offer. Argen­
tine Olympic hopefuls clarified that the government supported their negotia­
tions.86 The book highlighted support of the bid by Olympic notable Carl Diem, 
described as "the spiritual successor of Baron de Coubertin;' who after a visit to 
the city declared, "It seems to us that the moment has come for the Argentine to 
offer the world an Olympic festival:'87 
In spite oflocal and international encouragement, misgivings regarding the 
Buenos Aires' bid ran high both in Argentina-even within the Co mite Olfmpico 
Argentino - and abroad. Jorge N. Parsons, a Comites vice-president, expressed 
his qualms to the IOC chancellor stating, "we are having so many difficulties 
here that one hesitates to decide:' Bearing in mind that Parsons thought that 
Buenos Aires was so well equipped that only the Olympic village would have 
to be constructed, his worries had to be political. Adding to domestic second­
guessing was the IOC's position on the bid. IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer had 
warned Parsons that Brundage opposed the bid of Buenos Aires.88 Nevertheless, 
local Olympic officials continued with Buenos Aires' bid. 
Starting with the 1960 Olympics, the IOC required that all candidate cities 
answer a questionnaire addressing their technical and logistical capabilities to 
host the event.89 In February 1963 the Comite Olimpico Argentino returned its 
questionnaire to the IOC. Alberto Prebisch, who had been appointed mayor of 
Buenos Aires, fully supported the bid.90 While the bid process continued, inter­
nal dissent in the military allowed for another attempt at democracy. Elections 
were scheduled for July 1963. Arturo U. Illia was victorious; Peron ism remained 
banned. The following month President -elect Illia assured Oriani that if the I OC 
chose Buenos Aires for 1968, "I can promise the most extensive support of the 
people and government, definitively united, in their efforts to coat the Olympic 
Games with a splendour according to its precedents:'91 With Illia's endorsement, 
Oriani and Prebisch launched a last effort to convince IOC members to give the 
Games to Buenos Aires. Oriani affirmed that "Our country . . .  following demo­
cratic principles pointed by our National Constitution, is ready to carry on its 
progress till the final recoverY:'92 He correctly predicted the apprehension that 
the Argentine recent political history might have caused in the IOC. 
56 
Stymied Expectations 
The IOC session that selected the city for the 1968 Olympics met late in 
October 1963 in Baden-Baden; Illia had already been sworn into office. Illia's 
and Oriani's promises of national unity were totally unconvincing. Equally un­
persuasive were the three Argentine delegates that delivered a presentation on 
behalf of the nation's capital. It appeared that for the IOC members Buenos Ai­
res' bid did not even exist. In a landslide, Mexico City was granted the right to 
host the 1968 Olympics, while Buenos Aires received a meager two votes, one 
presumably from the lone Argentine IOC member.93 The result was a disaster 
when compared to the city's bid for the 1956 Olympics. That Buenos Aires' bid 
survived such domestic political turmoil could be seen as a sign that Argentine 
politicians-Peronist or not- understood the uses to which sport and the Olym­
pic Games could be subjected. However, that survival, as impressive as it was, 
did not pass muster with the IOC. Ultimately, the IOC's disregard for Buenos 
Aires was not unwise. In June of 1966, President Illia's fate was sealed by another 
coup. Although the nation hosted the football (soccer) FIFA World Cup in 1978, 
the dream of a Buenos Aires Olympics entered a long interregnum. 
The Bid for the 2004 Olympic Games 
The project of a Buenos Aires Olympics was dusted off in the 1990s by a 
Peronist-tlavored government. During his presidential campaign, Carlos S. 
Menem promised a litany of traditional Peronist populist policies. Howev­
er, soon after assuming the presidency in 1989, Menem replaced his party's 
conventional economic platform with a neoliberal, market-oriented program 
focused on the liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of the economy. 
The dramatic shift in economic policy produced a strong macroeconomic 
performance between 1991 and 1997. Argentina's successful story of reform 
became the darling of the economic international establishment. With domes­
tic and international credibility on the rise, in 1994 Menem pushed a consti­
tutional reform that would allow him to seek re-election. The manipulation 
of institutions to his advantage was typical of Menem's style of government, 
which did not help consolidate the fragile democratic system.94 Beyond merits 
and shortcomings, it was precisely during this period of radical reforms that 
Menem's government articulated its bid for the 2004 Olympics. Although the 
election of the host city was scheduled for September 1997, Menem's reelec­
tion for the 1995-1999 period allowed him to witness his Olympic campaign 
from start to finish. 
According to politicians in his party, the idea of bidding for the 2004 Olym­
pics originated with Menem himself.95 In regards to sport, Menem followed a 
traditionally-oriented Peronist policy. Even his critics acknowledged that Me­
nem's sport policy was the only area in which he proved to be a legitimate Per­
onist.96 The government support for sport was made evident in the funds poured 
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into the organization of the 1995 Pan-American Games held in the Argentinian 
coastal city of Mar del Plata. By the time of this event, it was quite clear in the 
Olympic Movement that Buenos Aires intended to bid for the 2004 Olympics. 
In mid -1994 Men em signed an executive decree creating the bid committee, led 
by Francisco A. Mayorga, state secretary of tourism and sports. The commit­
tee had a U.S. $6 million budget.97 Due to concerns about the expenditures of 
cities bidding for the Olympic Games, the work involved in the process, and 
the large number of cities interested in the 2004 Olympics, the IOC decided to 
implement a two-tiered selection process. In the first phase, an IOC evaluation 
commission would scrutinize the eleven cities' bids and prepare a report. Based 
on the evaluation commission's report, a selection college would choose five 
finalists on March 7, 1997. TI1e second phase, which allowed IOC members to 
visit the five finalists, would involve the election of the host city during the IOC 
session held in Lausanne on September 5, 1997. Knowing the election process, 
Mayorga's committee set out a comprehensive bidding plan.98 
The Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee produced an impressive dossier. 
The three-volume tome started by describing a long and distinguished Ar­
gentine Olympic history, the close defeat of the bid for the 1956 Olympics, 
the grandeur of Buenos Aires, and the city's love of sport, all of which gave 
the committee the "hope, strength and determination to struggle for the hon­
or of hosting the Olympic Games in SOUTH AMERICA FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN HISTORY:'99 The historical arguments used by previous city's bids 
had not been forgotten. However, knowing that history and claims of justice 
are relevant but hardly enough to gain the endorsement of the IOC, the Bue­
nos Aires 2004 bid committee composed a comprehensive technical blueprint 
for the Games. The centerpiece was an "Olympic corridor;' a combination of 
three major avenues along which there were existing and projected sport fa­
cilities. These facilities would have permitted the staging of 24 of the 28 sports 
planned in a tight geographical area. The "Olympic corridor;' which included 
the Olympic stadium, village, and media center, promised convenient access 
and transportation to and between competition venues. According to the dos­
sier, 75 percent of the venues were already in place, and the impact of the 
whole project on the city's environment would be minimal. The improvement 
of urban infrastructure and the legacy of the Games were as much emphasized 
as the cultural programs projected. 100 
While the bid was amply supported in Argentina, Mayorga and his team 
traveled the world to make its details known to the Olympic family. Late in 
1996, the IOC evaluation commission visited Buenos Aires and in February 
1997 sent all eleven bidding cities individualized technical reports. In the case 
of Buenos Aires, the evaluation commission lauded the "Olympic corridor;' 
among other features of the blueprint. Although there were some criticisms, 
the report was altogether positive. Mayorga informed Menem at once. The 
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leader of the bid committee was confident that Buenos Aires would pass the 
selection college cut on March 7, 1997 to become one of the five finalists.101 He 
was right. A month later IOC member Marc Hodler announced in Lausanne 
that Buenos Aires had made the cut, becoming the only South American city 
left in the race for the 2004 Olympics. Menem was ecstatic. From then on the 
key to the success of the bid was to convince IOC members that Buenos Aires 
was the best city for the Games. More than seventy IOC members accepted 
the invitation to visit Buenos Aires, most of whom were allegedly in1pressed 
with the city's project.102 However, according to the media, some IOC members 
were wary of the local organizational aptitude as well as of the honesty of some 
Argentine officials.103 
The days before the early September 1997 election, Buenos Aires' bid was 
a major topic of discussion in Argentine society. In the meantime, bid officials, 
as well as politicians, including Menem, sport administrators, civic leaders, and 
businesspeople traveled to Lausanne for the election. The bid committee made 
a carefully-prepared final presentation. Everybody knew that it was a long shot 
for Buenos Aires, but given the praise received by the bid, there were reasonably 
high expectations that the city would at least make a very good showing. Some 
might have believed that a huge surprise was possible. Hugo Porta, then state 
secretary of sports, declared: "I had the hope to win in Lausanne, although I 
knew that we were not the candidates:'104 The hopes proved to be groundless. 
Buenos Aires tied with Cape Town in the first round with the fewest votes- 16. 
In the run-offthat determined which of the two cities would be eliminated, Cape 
Town won 62-44. It was a bitter pill for Argentine officials to accept that Buenos 
Aires did not pass the first round. After the election many in Argentina sug­
gested possible reasons for the defeat: absence of Argentine sport administra­
tors at the international level, weak sport and urban infrastructure, infrequent 
organization of premier international sport events, poor athletic performances 
in previous Olympic Games, inadequate state support for athletes. As reason­
able as they were, these observations did not address the viability of the Games 
in the face of the larger Argentine political and economic context. There is little 
reason to disbelieve that the IOC paid close attention to Argentina's conditions 
in the 1990s and, more broadly, to its persistent and widespread political and 
economic instability. 
Although the 1983 democratic transition put an end to more than fifty years 
of military intervention in Argentine politics, the nation was still vulnerable and 
the subject of institutional crises. Indeed, Menem's inauguration took place six 
months earlier than scheduled because Raul Alfonsin, his predecessor, resigned 
amidst a chaotic economic situation. Menem finished his second mandate in 
1999 and transferred power to Fernando De la Rua, but his economic policies 
lingered, generating an extraordinary degree of social exclusion and inequal­
ity. In 1998 the Argentine economy entered into a long recession. Added to De 
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la Rua's own inabilities, this unpleasant legacy eventually led to a severe eco­
nomic down-turn and political crisis. De Ia Rua resigned on December 20, 2001. 
His vice-president, displeased with the administration's reaction to a corrup­
tion scandal, had resigned earlier. The interim president chosen by Congress 
resigned on December 31, 2001. The following day, Congress appointed anoth­
er interim president, who called for elections in 2003.105 On January 25, 2002, 
Jacques Rogge, president of the IOC, referring to the Argentine crisis, declared, 
"Look what happens today in that country and imagine what would have oc­
curred had we finally granted them the Olympic Games:' Rogge added that the 
IOC would award the Olympic Games to an emergent country only if it enjoys 
political, economic, and social stability, otherwise it "is a risk, as the current 
crisis in Argentina demonstrates:''06 
Given that so much rides for the Olympic Movement on celebrating suc­
cessful Games, IOC member Richard W Pound has contended, "it is easy to 
see that what is more important for the IOC is not necessarily to make the 
right choice for a particular city but to avoid making the wrong decision:'107 For 
Pound, a wrong decision is to "choose a city that proves to be incapable of orga­
nizing good Games."108 In this case, the IOC did not make such a mistake. After 
the failed Buenos Aires bid for the 2004 Olympics, some Argentines expressed 
interest in renewing the Olympic dream. Those heard before the 2001 political 
and economic crisis rapidly dissipated; those heard afterwards are quietly start­
ing to repeat the old aspirations. Their target seems to be 2016.109 
Interpreting Buenos Aires' Efforts to Host the Olympic Games 
Argentine politicians, sport administrators, and Olympic officials have shown 
interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires at various times during 
the twentieth century. Expressions of interest intensified after the creation in 
1923 of the Comite Olfmpico Argentino. Although Argentine Olympic officials 
have evidently perceived the attempts to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos 
Aires as an important aspect of their role as promoters of the Olympic Move­
ment in their nation, some of their claims about the status of several of these 
attempts are, as indicated in the introduction of this article, less evident. Some 
of the confusion regarding Buenos Aires' efforts might stem from the fact that 
during the first half century of the IOC, it was not always clear what amounted 
to an "official" bid. Before the 1950s, applying for the Olympic Games was "a 
much less standardized and detail oriented bidding and selection process" than 
what it would become.110 
Even if the bidding and selection process was not developed and struc­
tured until the 1950s, it seems clear that early claims to host the Olympic 
Games in Buenos Aires were unsubstantiated. Both Senator Gonzalez's com­
ments in 1909 and Aldao's in 1924 did not amount to more than amorphous 
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manifestations of desire that one day Buenos Aires would host the Olym­
pic Games. Although their comments indicate enthusiasm for the Olympic 
Movement, they did not include any comprehensive plan. Aldao's promise of 
a Champ des sports, including a massive national stadium, to be built on the 
premises of his Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires, could hardly be 
considered a plan. Having presided over the Argentine Olympic delegation to 
the 1924 Paris Olympics, he must have realized that a Champ des sports was 
important but by no means the only requirement to host the Olympic Games. 
Perhaps his comments were meant to convey the Argentine commitment to 
the Olympic Movement following the creation of the Comite Olimpico Ar­
gentino. In spite of hypothetical governmental support, the Champ des sports 
never materialized. 
The attempt to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires in 1936 is more 
difficult to analyze and classify. Initial communications between local Olympic 
officials and the IOC indicate a somewhat stronger pledge to organize the event 
than Aldao's 1924 promises. After the IOC manifested skepticism about Bue­
nos Aires' project, Aldao announced that whatever was needed for the Games 
would be finished before 1936, including the colossal stadium. Aldao even made 
vague promises related to assistance with travel and accommodation for visit­
ing delegations. According to him, the government supported the effort of the 
Comite Olfmpico Argentino. Aldao's reassurance made the rOC change its mind 
and Buenos Aires was listed as a candidate in 1930. However, the city was not 
considered in the 1931 election. Running afoul of IOC politics, Aldao and Al­
vear resigned from the organization in 1930. If the wrangle between them and 
the rOC leadership was not enough to destroy the chances of Buenos Aires, the 
September 1930 overthrow of President Yrigoyen's government killed the city's 
hopes. Resignations from the IOC combined with political turmoil was too 
much instability for the IOC. After Aldao's and Alvear's resignations, the bid 
was seen as imprudent, even within Argentina. 
After the Argentine IOC members resigned from the IOC, there were no 
more strong indications that Buenos Aires was still interested in the Games. 
It is also likely that for the coup authorities bringing the Games to Buenos Ai­
res was not important. For whatever reasons, the prospect of a 1936 Buenos 
Aires Olympics was abandoned both at home and abroad, which suggests that 
despite its initial strength, the project never reached any significant degree 
of maturity. Failure to reach the election stage for the 1936 Olympics did not 
discourage Argentine Olympic officials from wanting the 1940 Olympics, al­
though comments were not accompanied with any plans. Aspirations quickly 
evaporated. Similarly, the idea to host the Games in Buenos Aires in 1960 
was never developed. Those brief efforts, while showing commitment to an 
old hope and to the Olympic Movement, were merely informal expressions 
of interest. 
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The first attempt to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires that can be 
considered a full bid was the effort put forward for the 1956 Olympics. Fully 
embraced by Juan Peron's government, the bid was tied to the enorn1ous im­
portance that sport played in his political program and ambitions. In addition 
to arguing that Buenos Aires was a splendid city, that sport was wildly popular 
in Argentina, and that the Games had never been awarded to South America, 
Peron promised all kind of resources to host the event. Considering the ostenta­
tion displayed during the first Pan-American Games held in 1951 during his 
first presidency, it is likely that Peron would have fulfilled his promise. The bid 
rallied tremendous support in the IOC, eventually losing to Melbourne by one 
vote, one of closest bid elections ever. However, as pointed out, not all of South 
America was behind Buenos Aires' bid. Rio de Janeiro had also long aspired to 
be the first regional city to host the Games. It is not improbable that the con­
test for this "first" worked against the election of Buenos Aires. Opposition to 
Peron's autocratic regime also negatively influenced the outcome of the bid. Re­
gardless of the reasons for the loss, the roc must have been reassured with its 
decision when it learned that Peron had been ousted by a coup a year before 
the 1956 Olympics. The mere thought of the countless uncertainties that would 
have arisen had the Games been awarded to Buenos Aires must have been un­
settling. 
The second full bid was the attempt to host the 1968 Olympics in Buenos 
Aires. The Comite Olimpico Argentino repeated the arguments advanced in the 
race for the 1956 Olympics. The loss by one vote to Melbourne was constructed 
as a sign of unrequited Olympic commitment and used along with the claim 
saying that the Games had never been celebrated in South America as a sort of 
moral appeal. But the bid, which in the course of over two years endured and 
survived one coup and two democratically-elected presidents, generated anxi­
eties in Argentina and abroad. There were doubts within the Comite, and IOC 
President Brundage was opposed to Buenos Aires for 1968. The problems were 
not technical but political. Facing domestic political instability and opposed by 
the IOC president himself, the bid did not have any future. At the time of the 
election, it received two solitary votes. In all probability, South American IOC 
members rallied behind the bid of Mexico City, which became the first so-called 
Latin American city to host the Games in a landslide vote. Their meager support 
for Buenos Aires 1968 gave IOC members a measure of smugness when Presi­
dent Illia was overthrown in 1966. 
The last attempt to date to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was 
the bid for the 2004 Olympics. It was the best bid Buenos Aires ever presented. 
The usual historic arguments claimed the Games on moral ground. In addition, 
the bid dossier included a comprehensive technical blueprint to host the Games, 
whose highlight was the praised "Olympic corridor:' The bid gathered strong do­
mestic support and international attention. Consistent with President Menem's 
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market-oriented reforms, the bid was seen as a catalyst to showcase the progress 
of Argentina in the 1990s. However, local officials failed to assess or incorporate 
in their bid analyses and predictions of the larger political and economic forces 
at play in Argentina. Encouraged by the economic boom, they could not, or did 
not want, to perceive those forces. This blindness reveals a poor understanding 
ofiOC dynamics. The IOC, an institution with conservative lineage, did not fail 
to locate the bid in the larger domestic and international context. Although it 
praised the technical aspects of the bid, the IOC doubted the viability of what 
was promised. A fragile political system, whose central feature is instability and 
an irregularly performing economy, was not the ideal framework for the IOC. 
The elimination of Buenos Aires in the first round was not by any means what 
Argentine officials imagined. But the IOC was right. The crash of the economy 
and the political disaster of late 2001 confirmed the acumen of the IOC's cus­
tomary position to elect host cities: prioritize stability, even if it means postpon­
ing the materialization of the universal values of the Games. 
The protracted interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires sheds 
lights on the role and importance that Argentina has imagined for itself in the 
Olympic Movement. The expressions of interest and bids studied have usually 
been portrayed as a measure of continuity in the Argentine commitment to the 
Olympic Movement since its creation in 1894, as well as a sign of regional lead­
ership in the diffusion of its ideals. Indeed, it has been a recurrent theme in the 
bids to maintain that Buenos Aires was carrying not only the aspirations of the 
Argentine people but also that of all South Americans. The hosting of the Games 
in Buenos Aires has also been predicted as an event that would take national 
and regional sport to new and unprecedented heights. Along with the rationale 
of strong historical leadership, Argentine Olympic hopefuls have insisted that 
the universalism inherent in the Olympic ideals merits bringing the Games to 
South America and that Buenos Aires is ideally suited for the challenge. This 
argument found even more vitality after Buenos Aires lost the 1956 Olympics 
to Melbourne by one vote. Locally, this close election and the fact that Buenos 
Aires was a finalist for the 2004 Olympics have been viewed as an indication of 
the distinctive position Argentina enjoys in the Olympic Movement. 
In addition to the self-appointed leadership role in regional Olympic mat­
ters, Buenos Aires' attempts to host the Olympic Games reveal an intention to 
situate the city among the great capitals of the world. This, of course, was inti­
mately connected with the portrayal of Argentina as a vibrant nation at the "New 
World" center of Western civilization. The bids' narratives told a story of Buenos 
Aires as a dynamic metropolis possessing the charm and the qualities essential 
to host the greatest of all sport events. This is consistent with the purposeful 
portrayal, domestically and internationally, by Argentine elites throughout the 
twentieth century of Buenos Aires as the Paris of South America.111 In the minds 
of many portefzos as well as foreigners, Buenos Aires has such a Parisian char-
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acter, which arguably makes it so different from all other South American cities. 
Seen as a European enclave, a Buenos Aires Olympics felt much closer to the 
Eurocentric project started by Coubertin in the early 1890s. The quest to garner 
the Olympic Games for Buenos Aires has cemented Argentina's self-determined 
place in Latin America. 
The continuities in the legitimation of narratives constructed by Buenos Ai­
res' Olympic campaigns to project certain representations of the role, and the 
importance of Argentina in the Olympic Movement, as well as of Buenos Aires 
and Argentina in the Western world have been accompanied by some fractures 
that show the changing relationship among politics, sport, and Olympic mat­
ters in Argentina. The earlier designs to host the Games in Buenos Aires were 
articulated at a time in which "sporting activity in Argentina was largely a pri­
vate effort by various sport associations, while the state was conspicuous by its 
absence or apathY:'112 That is why Aldao's Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos 
Aires, along with the Comite Olimpico Argentino, was at the center of those ef­
forts. The state was, of course, present, but its role was merely supportive. The 
actors carrying the work forward, albeit connected with the government, were 
in the private realm. This was quite visible in the preparations for the failed 1942 
Pan-American Games. The structure changed with Peron. The state became 
conspicuously active in sport politics. In the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the 
government through its control of the sport and Olympic spheres became the 
main actor. After Peron, governments were never again apathetic about sport, 
but their involvement was not always so focused and centralized. Starting with 
the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the more the state apparatus controlled sport, the 
more the bids were tied to partisan political programs. 
Even though failure has been the common denominator of the now nearly 
century-long aspiration to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires, there is 
much to learn from the continuities and fractures, that is the history, of these 
attempts. The legitimating narratives constructed around Buenos Aires' efforts 
constitute a fascinating entry to analyze the entangled connections of politics, 
sport, and the Olympic Movement in Argentina. In the attempt to construct 
an Olympic Buenos Aires, Argentines have, to use Benedict Anderson's ter­
minology, told themselves stories about who they are and who they want to 
become.113 After the relative stillness that followed the failed bid for the 2004 
Olympics, the old Olympic hope is gradually being revived. The success of Ar­
gentine athletes in Athens, who won the nation's first gold medal in more than 
fifty years, as well as the recent economic recovery, might be the forces behind 
the move. Whether or not Buenos Aires bids in the near future, the debate itself 
is forcing the Argentine people to ponder once again who they are and who 
they want to become. 
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A Brief Excursus into the Future 
In May 2006 the Pan-American Sport Organization (PASO) held its general 
assembly in Buenos Aires. The occasion drew Olympic and sport leaders from 
the Western hemisphere and beyond. Indeed, Rogge made the long trip to Bue­
nos Aires. As is customary for this kind of sport events, the gathering was also 
visited by a number of local politicians. The Comite Olimpico Argentino's set­
up in the Hotel Panamericano was impeccable. Although the PASO general 
assembly was to discuss hemispheric sport affairs, for some the temptation to 
resuscitate the dream of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was impossible to 
abandon. After all, it was a gathering of the hemispheric Olympic family and 
it was, in all places, in Buenos Aires. Opening the general assembly, Argentine 
Vice-President, Daniel Scioli, declared, "The city of Buenos Aires can be the 
host of the Olympic Games in 2016. From the current recovery of our country 
we have to work towards this objective that, without a doubt, we can achieve:'114 
Scioli went on to say that the Games provide ample opportunity to develop in­
dustries such as sport and tourism. Rogge and Mario Vazquez Rafia, president 
of PASO, were supportive of the idea. While the former thought that Buenos 
Aires had the necessary conditions to bid, the latter believed that it has the ca­
pacity to organize the Olympic Games. 115 
However, the renewed prospect of a Buenos Aires Olympics did not en­
tice all local political and sport leaders. Without contradicting either Scioli or 
influential Olympic actors, Claudio Morresi, state secretary of sports, warned, 
"That is a dream of everyone, but we must be cautious:'116 Some journalists were 
more emphatic against a bid. Mariano Ryan, writing for the Buenos Aires daily 
Clarfn, affirmed that in spite of the recent economic recovery, a country with the 
levels of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity of Argentina couldn't aspire to 
host the Games in the near future. He also mentioned that the South American 
Games, a rather humble operation compared to the Olympic Games, sched­
uled to take place in Buenos Aires in November 2006, was giving headaches 
to the city's organizers.117 It is worth mentioning that late in 2001 Cordoba, a 
city in the center of Argentina, reneged from organizing the 2002 South Ameri­
can Games-an embarrassing act for a nation with Olympic aspirations.U8 The 
organization of the 2006 South American Games in Buenos Aires was locally 
portrayed as another measure of the country's recovery. 
Critics of a future bid to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires rightly 
point out the social exclusion and inequality raging in Argentina. This does 
not deny the stabilization and growth of the economy in the last four years 
but indicates the necessity to debate whether the nation should even consider 
bidding for the Games in such a social environment. What the critics only im­
ply tangentially, since the economic and social spheres are always intimately 
interwoven with it, is the political viability to bring the Games to Buenos Ai-
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res. Given Argentina's long history of institutional instability and lack of cred­
ibility, this seems to be the crucial point. Things might be changing on this 
front too. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo be­
lieve that "If institutional instability remains a central feature of contemporary 
Argentine politics, however, the scope of that instability may be narrowing.'' 
The democratic institutions established in the 1980s and the market -oriented 
institutions created in the 1990s have survived several political and economic 
crises. The prospect of renewed military intervention seems to have faded. For 
Levitsky and Murillo, 
[t]his core institutional stability constitutes a significant break with 
earlier patterns, and it permits a measure of optimism about Argen­
tina's political future, even as the country struggles to recover from the 
devastating crises of the not-too-distant past.119 
Political and economic institutions take a long time and a great deal of effort to 
solidify. Until that mild optimism materializes in stable, credible, and predict­
able institutions, the dream of a Buenos Aires Olympics remains fragile. In the 
meantime, Argentina should attend to its pressing social needs and demands 
so that everyone in the nation can have Olympic dreams. However, if Buenos 
Aires articulates a bid in the near future, one has to pay close attention; for, as 
Pound has observed, the IOC's results in terms of selecting host cities "are often 
astonishing, and have been known to defy subsequent analysis.''120 With the IOC 
one never knows for sure. 
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